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TOWARDS RESOLVING 42 U.S.C. § 1981
WITH THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND
THE RIGHT TO ASSOCIATE
Runyon v. McCrary1
Bobbe's School and Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., were private schools
operating in Virginia. Each maintained a student population of approxi-
mately 200 studefnts during the regular academic year, and from 100 to
200 students during summer camp. Both schools, attempting to attract
students, advertised in the yellow pages of the phonebook and mailed
advertising brochures addressed to "resident."
In May 1969, Mr. and Mrs. Gonzales toured the summer camp
facilities at Fairfax-Brewster School and applied for admission of their son
Colin, a Negro. After receiving a form letter rejection, Mr. Gonzales
telephoned Fairfax-Brewster and was informed that the school was not
integrated. Mr. Gonzales then telephoned Bobbe's School. A similar call
was placed by Mrs. McCrary in regards to the admission of her son
Michael. Both were informed that Bobbe's School was not integrated.
Colin Gonzales, through his parents, filed suit against Fairfax-
Brewster School alleging that the school's policy of denying admission to
Negroes was a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.2 Colin Gonzales and Michael
McCrary, through their parents, filed a class action against Bobbe's School
on similar grounds. The trial court found both schools in violation of the
ActA This holding was affirmed by the court of appeals 4 and the United
States Supreme Court.
Section 1981 is derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866,5 a major
piece of Reconstruction legislation passed pursuant to the thirteenth
amendment. Given its origin, it is not surprising that § 1981 only prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, and not on the basis of sex,6 religion, or
1. 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1974) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactations of every kind, and to no other.
3. 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973).
4. 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975).
5. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1865-1867).
6. Abshire v. Chicago & E. Ill. R.R., 352 F. Supp. 601, 605 (N.D. Ill. 1972);
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racial exclusion on religious grounds.7 Its protection extends to whites as
well as blacks.
8
Runyon was based on the § 1981 right to contract provision. This
provision prohibits discrimination, public or private, on the basis of race in
the making and enforcement of contracts.9 This provision only applies
where a contract is involved; it will not prohibit discrimination on the basis
of race in a non-contractual situation. However, the § 1981 definition of
contract is very broad. The passing of any consideration between the
parties would be sufficient to constitute a contract under § 1981.10 Further,
§ 1981 takes effect prior to the time at which a contract is formed by
prohibiting a discriminatory refusal to offer to contract. 1
The decision in Runyon continues the revival of the 1866 Civil Rights
Act which began in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 12 Jones reversed nearly a
century of precedent which had restrictively construed both § 1981 and §
1982 and refused to extend them to private discrimination.'3 Section 1982,
a companion to § 1981 in the 1866 Act, prohibited private discrimination in
the sale or rental of real or personal property. In dicta, the Court stated
that both the wording and the legislative history of § 1981 also dictated its
application to private discrimination. 14 This interpretation is subject to
dispute. 15
7. Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2592 (1976) (dicta).
8. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976) (Two white
employees and one black were charged with misappropriating cargo of their em-
ployer. Although the white employees were dismissed, the black was not. The white
employees claimed that the employer was in violation of § 1981 which they alleged
applied to whites as well as blacks. Held: § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in
private employment against whites and non-whites alike. Plaintiffs also filed under
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
The potential impact of the Runyon and McDonald decisions is far reaching.
For example, it may now be impermissible for private law and medical schools to
maintain affirmative action admissions programs. Since § 1981 prohibits private
racially motivated refusals to contract, and since McDonald extends this protection
to whites as well as blacks, then affirmative action programs for minority racial
groups may violate § 1981 since there is racially motivated contractual discrimina-
tion. The only limitation on § 198 l's application to reverse discrimination would be
the rights of freedom of association and privacy.
9. See statute quoted note 2 supra.
10. Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (1976).
11. Scott v. Young, 421 F.2d 143 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970)
(An admission price to an amusement park was found to constitute a contract). See
also U.S. v. Medical Soc'y of S.C., 298 F. Supp. 145 (D.S.C. 1967); Black v. Bonds,
308 F. Supp. 774 (S.D. Ala. 1969).
12. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
13. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1906); Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883).
14. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-35 (1968).
15. See the dissent of J. White at 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2604 (1976) (Justice White
argues that the majority misconstrued both the legislative history of the Act, and
the concept of contract). See also Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D.
Ala. 1971); Smith v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515 (N.D. Okla. 1970).
19771
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Jones forewarned of a similar extension of § 1981 to private discrimi-
nation. The Court emphasized the common origin of the sections. Also, it
expressly overruled Hodges v. United States16 which had restrictively con-
strued § 1981 and refused to extend it to private discrimination.
In the aftermath of Jones, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its interpre-
tation of § 1981 in a series of cases beginning with Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park.17 In Sullivan, § 1981 was used to prohibit a private hunting park
from denying a Negro the contractual opportunity to enter the hunting
park. In Tillman v. Wheaton Haven Recreation Ass'n,18 a private swimming
club adopted and enforced a racially discriminatory guests admissions
policy. In remanding the case for further proceedings under § 1981, the
Court found that § 1981 and § 1982 were similarly derived and should be
similarly construed to extend to private discrimination. Finally, in Johnson
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,19 a case involving discrimination against a
black with regard to seniority rights, the Court held that § 1981 prohibited
private discrimination on the basis of race in employment.
There appears to be no question that § 1981 will be used to prohibit
private, racially motivated refusals to contract. But, § 1981 has been given
widespread application by lower courts in combatting contractual discrimi-
nation.20 Its greatest impact has been in the area of employment discrimi-
nation. 21 Section 1981 has been used to prohibit private racial discrimina-
But see Larsen, The New Law of Race Relations, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 470; Comment,
Racial Discrimination in Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866,36 U. CHI. L.
REv. 615 (1969).
16. 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
17. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
18. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
19. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
20. Payne v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F.2d 1107 (8th Cir. 1972) (A Negro claimed
that he was subjected to different and less favorable conditions of employment than
white employees. The court found that § 1981 prohibits private employment
discrimination on the basis of race); Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621 (8th
Cir. 1972) (§ 1981 prohibits private discrimination in employment on the basis of
race); Brown v. Gasten County Dyeing Machine Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), Cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972) (A black alleged discrimination against his employer in
hiring, promotion, pay and other conditions of employment). But see Cook v.
Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1972) (Action against a news-
paper for discriminatory refusal to publish bridal announcements of blacks. Held: §
1981 extends only to state action and does not bar private discrimination on the
basis of race); Smith v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515, 518 (N.D. Okla.
1970) (Action by several employees of defendant alleging discriminatory promotion
practices. Held: § 1981 does not extend to private discrimination on the basis of
race).
21. Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Plaintiff alleged that defendant freight company conspired with defendant union
to discriminate against blacks in employment. Held: § 1981 prohibits private dis-
crimination on the basis of race); Young v. International Telephone & Telegraph
Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3rd Cir. 1971) (Facts and holding similar to Macklin); Bou-
dreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971)
[Vol. 42
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tion in hiring,22 firing,23 and promotion.24 However, § 1981 has not been
limited to employment discrimination, but also has been used to obtain
admission to a private amusement park,2 5 admission to a private hospital,
26
insurance from a private company,27 service in a restaurant, 28 and rental of
an apartment. 29
The extension of § 1981 to private discrimination raises the constitu-
tional issues of freedom of association and privacy. Given the fact that
contracts permeate our private and public lives, there must come a point at
which the § 1981 right to contract must yield to competing interests.
Although the rights of association and privacy overlap to some extent, they
are separate interests.
Although Runyon recognized the importance of the right to freedom
of association, it refused to acknowledge that the right includes, at times,
the right to exclude others, on the basis of race, from one's associations.
3 0
Freedom of association is not explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution; it
warrants constitutional protection because of its penumbral relationship to
first amendment rights.3 1 Protection of the right to associate has been
found necessary for the stimulation and protection of the effective advoca-
cy of beliefs and ideas.32 The theory is that a homogenous group will be
(Discrimination in concitions of employment. Held: § 1981 prohibits private em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of race).
22. Young v. ITT, 438 F.2d 757 (3rd Cir. 1971); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge
Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970) (Defendant's
racially discriminatory hiring policies designed to exclude Negroes was prohibited
by § 1981).
23. Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971) (Negro
discharged by his employer on the basis of race); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc.,
431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970) (Defendant's action in discharging a Negro solely on
the basis of race was found to violate § 1981).
24. Ellison v. Rock Hill Printing & Finishing Co., 64 F.R.D. 415 (D.S.C. 1974);
Copeland v. Mead Corp., 51 F.R.D. 266 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
25. Scott v. Young, 421 F.2d 143 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970).
26. U.S. v. Medical Soc'y of S.C., 298 F. Supp. 145 (D.S.C. 1969).
27. Sims v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 343 F. Supp. 112 (D.
Mass. 1972).
28. Black v. Bonds, 308 F. Supp. 774 (S.D. Ala. 1969).
29. Young v. A.A.A. Realty Co., 350 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D.N.C. 1972).
30. 96 S. Ct. at 2596 (1976).
31. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (Defendant was charged with contempt for failure to relate
either the contents of a speech, or his knowledge of the Progressive party. Held:
Defendant's first amendment rights of expression and association could not be
overridden except by a sufficiently compelling state interest).
32. Buckley v. Valleo, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976) (Limits on campaign expenditures
violate plaintiff's right of expression and right of association); Kusper v. Pontikes,
414 U.S. 51 (1973) (State primary law which forbids a voter from changing party
affiliation and voting in another party's primary election without a 23 month delay.
Held: The primary law violates the voter's right of association); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960) (Arkansas statute which required teachers to file an affidavit
19771
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able to formulate and advance its beliefs more effectively when it is free
from outside interference. The protection extends beyond political beliefs
to encompass association for social, legal or economic purposes."3 Freedom
of association should include the freedom of segregation where the associa-
tion is a highly personal one, such as a contract for a babysitter or private
tutorf14 The application of § 1981 to such highly personal areas would
infringe upon both the freedom of association and the right of privacy.35
The application of the right of association beyond such highly person-
al situations to large groups presents a more complex problem. Although it
did not confront the issue directly, NAACP v. Alabama3 6 provided us with
insight into the problems involved. In NAACP, the Supreme Court found
that the NAACP's right to association was violated by a court order requir-
ing it to produce its membership lists pursuant to state law. The Court
emphasized that release of the lists would subject the NAACP to private
pressure which, in turn, would inhibit the members' desire to associate. In
reaching its decision, the Court weighed the state's interest in production
of the lists against the NAACP's right to associate and need for privacy of
the lists.
The Court recognized that the right to associate is not absolute, but is
subject to being overridden by a sufficiently compelling state interest.37
Under § 1981, the state interest would be the prohibition of discrimination
on the basis of race. The countervailing interest would be the group's right
to associate. In the balancing process, the court should weigh the strength
of the association's claim to first amendment protections, and its need for
privacy.
Using this balancing process, the Runyon decision, that Bobbe's School
and Fairfax-Brewster School did not have the right to segregate, is recon-
stating every organization to which they have belonged in the previous five years
violated their right of association); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
33. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (Overturned Connec-
ticut statute forbidding dissemination of information on contraceptives); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430-31 (1963) (Statute forbidding solicitation of legal busi-
ness held to violate right of expression and association when applied to an associa-
tion which sought to protect legal rights).
34. Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976) at 2602 (Powell J., concurring).
35. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,152-53 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
36. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
37. U.S. Civil Service Commission v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548 (1973) (Congress can constitutionally forbid federal employees from engaging
in political campaigning); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (Refusal to recognize
SDS on college campus. Held: Not violative of first amendment to refuse to
recognize SDS on campus where there was sufficiently compelling state interest);
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1958) (Right to associate can be overridden by
a sufficiently compelling state interest. In Scales, the right of a communist organiza-
tion to associate was found to be outweighed by the state interest as defined in the
Internal Security Act); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
(Vol. 42
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cilable with the holding in NAACP. In that case NAACP had a strong claim
to first amendment protections and a strong need for privacy, but the state
interest was not compelling. In Runyon, both schools had a weaker claim to
first amendment protection. Both schools were more public than private,
and there was a compelling state interest-the right of blacks to get a
quality education.
The constitutional guarantee of privacy also represents a limitation on
§ 1981. This right has generally been limited to such highly personal areas
as the use of contraceptives,38 the decision to terminate a pregnancy,3 9 and
the use of pornography in one's own home.4" The right of privacy corre-
lates to the privateness of the activity. As an activity becomes increasingly
public, the strength of its claim to a right of privacy is diminished. Like
other constitutional rights, the right of privacy is not absolute, and may be
restricted by a sufficiently compelling state interest.41
In Runyon, Bobbe's School and Fairfax-Brewster School were not
accorded protection under the right of privacy because of the public nature
of their activities. The Court noted that both schools appealed to a public
constituency through their advertising, and utilized no selective element
other than race.42 The right of privacy should provide a limitation on §
1981 where the activity is actually private. When an individual hires some-
one to work in a private situation, such as a housekeeper or babysitter in a
private home, he should fall within constitutional privacy protections.43 In
such a case, § 1981 should yield to the right of privacy. Similarly, a small,
highly personalized school with heavily restricted admissions should also be
protected. Barring probable ethical problems a similar claim might be
made for certain personal business relations as attorney-client or
doctor-patient.
As with the right to associate, the problem becomes more complex
where a larger organization is involved. It is possible, arguing by analogy,
that any private club or organization could gain an exemption from § 1981
through the private club exemption contained in the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.44 In Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks,45 a federal district
38. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
39. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
41. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972).
42. 96 S. Ct. at 2595 n.10.
43. Id. at 2602. A like claim could be made for a great master of the arts such
as a violinist, who accepted three prize students per year to live with him and receive
personalized instruction.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 etseq. The private club exemption is 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e)
which provides:
The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to a private club or other
establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the
facilities of such establishment are made available to the customers or
1977]
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court found the exemption applicable on the basis that provisions of one
statute which specifically focus on a particular problem will prevail over
provisions of a different statute more general in its coverage, in the absence
of express contrary legislative intent.4 6 Although more than one lower
court has held the exemption applicable to § 198 1,4 the Supreme Court
has not decided the issue. In Runyon, the Court avoided the question by
finding that because both schools were actually public, they would not
qualify for the exemption.
The Supreme Court has signalled that should the exemption apply to
§ 1981, then an organization must be private in fact to claim the exemption.
In Tillman v. Wheaton Haven Recreation Assn 48 the Court held that a club
which had no selective element other than race would not qualify for the
exemption. Insight into what constitutes a private club may be gained from
Cornelius where the Elks Club was found to be a private club. The criteria
used by the court included the selectiveness of the group in the admission
of members, the membership procedures of the group, the degree of
membership control in regard to the admission of new members, the
history of the organization, the existence and substantiality of dues, the
limitation of club facilities to members, the non-predominance of the profit
motive, and the lack of organizational advertisement.49 In applying these
criteria, the court was persuaded that the Elks Club was private because of
its admission requirements and procedures. 50
If the exemption does apply to § 1981, any organization which is
private, even a private school, qualifies for the exemption. Organizations
patrons of an establishment within the scope of subsection (b) of this
section.
45. 382 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Conn. 1974).
46. Id. at 1201.
47. Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182 (D.
Conn. 1974); Sims v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 343 F. Supp. 112 (D.
Mass. 1972).
48. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
49. 382 F. Supp. at 1203.
50. Id.
At the time of the alleged violation of § 1981, the Elks' constitution
provided that only white male citizens of the United States who believe in
God and who live within the jurisdictional limits of the local lodge were
eligible for membership. Thus, besides black males, other non-"whites",
women, non-believers, aliens and out-of-towners were also not welcome.
The constitution further provides that an applicant must answer various
questions about his background and be sponsored by a member in good
standing. The secretary of the lodge submits the application to the mem-
bership, and the chief officer refers it to a standing investigative committee
composed of members of the lodge. As part of the investigative process,
the applicant is required to appear before the committee. The report of
the committee is presented to the membership at the regular meeting, and
the entire membership is notified that the applicant will be considered at
the next meeting. Three negative votes bar the applicant.
(Vol. 42
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